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The Inventory Search and the
Arrestee's Privacy Expectation
When a person is arrested and taken to jail for incarceration, it is standard
procedure for jail employees to conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee
and take custody of his clothes and personal effects.1 The items found on
the person of the arrestee are placed in an envelope, which is sealed and taken
to the property room of the jail for safekeeping. 2 Although the warrantless
inventory search has consistently been upheld as constitutional,3 its permissi-
ble scope is as yet undetermined.' Courts have been inconsistent in dealing
with the question of what types of searches are permitted by the inventory
exception and under what circumstances such searches may take place.'
An area in which courts have parted company in interpreting the inventory
search exception to the warrant requirement is the investigatory search of the
arrestee's inventoried personal effects. 6 There is little question that police may
subject the arrestee to a search prior to placing him in the cell. However,
the issue arises when a police officer later conducts a second warrantless search
of the arrestee's inventoried personal effects in order to uncover evidence of
the crime for which the arrestee is incarcerated or of unrelated criminal activity.
This Note begins with an examination of the nature of the inventory search
and the purposes which justify its existence. Following a discussion of in-
vestigatory searches and the warrant requirement, the Note describes the situa-
tions in which warrantless investigatory searches of arrestees' personal effects
take place, and the manner in which courts have reacted to such searches.
The Note then turns to the privacy interests involved in investigatory searches.
of the arrestee's inventoried personal effects and the arguments advanced by
those who contend that no warrant should be required before conducting the
search, and concludes that police may conduct a warrantless search of the
1. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). See generally Stroud, The Inven-
tory Search and the Fourth Amendment, 4 IND. LEGAL F. 471 (1971).
2. In addition to taking custody of the arrestee's personal effects, police administrative pro-
cedure may include listing the items for police records. Illinois v. Lafayette, 51 U.S.L.W. 4829,
4831 (U.S. June 20, 1983).
3. Lafayette, 51 U.S.L.W. at 4830; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
4. See A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 230.6, at 529 (Proposed Official
Draft) (commentary).
5. See infra notes 32-33.
6. Two types of inventory searches are routinely conducted by police. The first is the inven-
tory search of an impounded automobile. For an example of a case involving this situation,
see Opperman, 428 U.S. 364. The second is the search of an arrestee's person at the jail subse-
quent to arrest. For example, see Lafayette, 51 U.S.L.W. 4829; Robinson, 414 U.S. 218. This
Note is concerned solely with the search of the arrestee's person, although it will rely in part
upon principles applicable to automobile searches.
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arrestee's person' subsequent to a valid arrest; however, a warrant must be
obtained or an established exception s to the warrant requirement must be
demonstrated before police may conduct subsequent searches of the arrestee's
inventoried personal effects.
I. THE INVENTORY SEARCH
The inventory search has developed as a result of routine police procedure
in protecting both the police and the arrestee.9 By conducting an inventory
search of the arrestee and taking possession of his personal effects before
placing him in the jail cell, three distinct needs are fulfilled. First, the arrestee's
property is protected while it remains in police custody.'" If the arrestee were
allowed to maintain possession of his personal effects in the jail cell, items
of value may be lost or stolen. Second, the police are protected against claims
or disputes over lost or stolen property." When the arrestee's personal effects
are stored in a sealed envelope in the police property room, it is less likely
that the arrestee can legitimately allege that his effects were stolen or mishandl-
ed by police or jail employees. Third, the police are protected from potential
danger.' 2 By removing the arrestee's effects from his person, it is less likely
that he may possess concealed weapons which may be used against the police.'
3
The term "inventory search" is in a sense a misnomer' in that generally
it is not intended to uncover evidence of a crime.'I While searches for evidence
are criminal in nature, inventory searches are considered noncriminal, routine
administrative caretaking functions.' 6 Moreover, while items seized as evidence
7. For a discussion of the requirements imposed before police may search luggage seized
pursuant to arrest, see Lafayette, 51 U.S.L.W. 4829; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
8. The established exceptions are hot pursuit, stop and frisk, plain view, consent, automobile,
and search incident to arrest. Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is And What It
Is Not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REv. 987, 988 (1976); Lafayette,
51 U.S.L.W. 4829 (inventory); Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S.
861 (1974) (open fields).
9. Illinois v. Lafayette, 51 U.S.L.W. 4829, 4830 (U.S. June 20, 1983).
10. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976); Farrie v. State, 255 Ind. 681,
683, 266 N.E.2d 212, 216 (1971) (dissenting opinion). Although Opperman discussed the pro-
priety of an inventory of an automobile, the opinion provides guidelines to determine the con-
stitutionality of any type of inventory. Dearing v. State, 393 N.E.2d 167, 171 (Ind. 1979).
11. Opperman, 248 U.S. at 369.
12. Id.
13. By removing all of the arrestee's effects from his person, other prisoners are protected
as well. Even common items such as keys and combs may be converted into dangerous weapons
in a jail cell. In Lafayette, 51 U.S.L.W. at 4831, Chief Justice Burger noted that arrested persons
have been known to injure themselves or others with belts, knives, drugs or other items on their
person while being detained.
14. A "search" may be defined as "lt]he act of seeking or looking diligently; [i]nquiry; in-
vestigation." FUNK & WAGNALL'S NEw STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1135
(1956).
15. While the inventory search is justified in part by the need to preserve evidence, United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973), its basic function is that of a caretaking procedure.
16. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370.
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are intended for further examination, items taken pursuant to an inventory
search are held by police as bailees. 7 The items taken by police pursuant to
an inventory search are surrendered to the arrestee when he is released on
bail,' whereas items seized as evidence of a crime are held by police pending
trial and are not surrendered to the arrestee.
II. THE INVESTIGATORY SEARCH
The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.'
9
Investigative searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by a judge or magistrate, are considered to be per se unreasonable
under the fourth amendment. 20 A few well-delineated exceptions " have been
established to provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining
a warrant, such as danger to law officers or the risk of loss or destruction
of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral judicial
officer.2 2 The reach of each exception is limited to those intrusions which
are necessary to accommodate the identified needs of society.
23
While the inventory search serves primarily a custodial purpose,2 4 the in-
vestigatory search is intended to uncover evidence of a crime. 25 Moreover,
while inventory searches do not require any showing of probable cause and
do not require a warrant, 26 police must either demonstrate that an exception
to the fourth amendment warrant requirement exists, or seek the advance
17. See Mozzetti v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 484 P.2d 84, 89-90, 94 Cal. Rptr.
412 (1971) (statute imposing liability on police only on showing of gross negligence); Motion
for Leave to File a Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner,
of Americans For Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. at 7, Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 ("[S]ound
public policy demands that police officers, when exercising custodial control, even for a brief
period, over the property of private citizens, be held to a greater standard of care than that
which would excuse all but gross negligence.").
18. Given the noncriminal nature of the inventory search and the role of police as bailees,
the arrestee may be allowed to designate a third party to take possession of his personal effects,
rather than allowing them to remain in police custody. See generally Opperman, 428 U.S. at
392-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (plurality opinion); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
21. Id.
22. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 735, 759 (1979); United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972).
23. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 760; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
24. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
25. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1976).
26. Illinois v. Lafayette, 51 U.S.L.W. 4829, 4830 (U.S. June 20, 1983); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
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approval of a judicial officer before conducting an investigatory search." The
judicial officer determines whether probable cause under the fourth amend-
ment exists by asking whether the facts and circumstances within the police
officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution
to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.28 The judicial of-
ficer's scrutiny is intended to eliminate searches not based upon probable cause
and to limit searches to those intrusions which are necessary under the
circumstances. 9
Although the investigating police officer may be in the position to exercise
his judgment to determine probable cause, the fourth amendment requires
that in most situations the determination be made by a judicial officer. By
requiring the judicial officer to make the determination of probable cause,
rather than allowing the determination to be made by the police officer engaged
in the "often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," 3 society is en-
sured that an objective mind is interposed between the citizen and the police'.3
The Supreme Court has consistently rejected arguments that a law enforce-
ment officer's own determination of probable cause to conduct a search should
excuse his otherwise unexplained failure to procure a warrant beforehand.3"
III. THE SECOND SEARCH
When the arrestee is subjected to the inventory search, items police believe
to be evidence of the crime for which he was arrested or related to other
criminal activity are taken from the arrestee and held as evidence. The re-
mainder of the arrestee's personal effects are placed in the inventory envelope
and held for safekeeping. Uncertainty arises when subsequent investigation
indicates that further evidence of a crime may be found in the inventory
envelope among the arrestee's personal effects. The courts confronted with
this situation have been forced to decide whether police, after conducting a
non-investigatory inventory search of the arrestee's personal effects, may later
conduct an investigatory search of the inventory envelope without first ob-
taining a warrant.
33
27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357.
28. The facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge must be based upon reasonably
trustworthy information and not merely upon the officer's intuition. Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41, 55 (1967). In Illinois v. Gates, 51 U.S.L.W. 4709, 4711 (U.S. June 8, 1983), the Court
overruled the "two-pronged" test of Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and substituted
the traditional "totality of the circumstances" test employed in probable cause determinations.
29. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467.
30. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
31. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481 (1963); McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
32. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). But see United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (allowing warrantless search of container found in automobile
being searched pursuant to automobile exception when officer had probable cause to believe
the container held evidence of a crime).
33. Police may seek to avoid allegations that they conducted a search by placing the arrestee's
effects in a transparent container. An officer could thereby use his visual senses to examine
[Vol. 59:321
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The issue of whether a warrant is required before police may conduct an
investigatory search of an inventory envelope was addressed in People v.
Rivard.3 4 In Rivard, the defendant was arrested for armed robbery and sub-
jected to an inventory search at the police station. The following morning
after reviewing a list of the property taken in the robbery, a detective realized
that a ring found on the arrestee's finger might match one taken in the rob-
bery. Without first obtaining a warrant, the detective went to the jail and
obtained the ring from the arrestee's personal property locker.
In affirming the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress
the ring, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded:
Defendant concedes that no warrant would have been required to seize
the ring during the inventory. Thus, a search warrant to again look at
the ring, already in police custody, does not make sense. Once the ring
had been exposed to police view under unobjectionable circumstances and
lawfully taken by the police for safekeeping, any expectation of privacy
with respect to that item had at least partially dissipated so that no
reasonable expectation of privacy was breached by Detective Van Alstine
taking a "second look."35
While some courts have concluded that a warrant is required before police
may conduct an investigatory search of the arrestee's inventoried personal
property,3 6 the majority of the courts confronted with the question have
adopted the approach taken in Rivard and have allowed such investigatory
searches to take place without a warrant. 3 1 Courts which have held that no
warrant is required before police may conduct an investigatory search of the
the container's contents without opening it. Such activity should be deemed impermissible, however,
for it would serve as a pretext for an otherwise illegal investigatory search. Inherent in the duty
of police to protect the arrestee's property interest is the duty to safeguard against unnecessary
invasions of the arrestee's privacy. This interest cannot be protected if the arrestee's personal
effects are placed in a transparent container where they are readily subject to public view.
34. 59 Mich. App. 530, 230 N.W.2d 6 (Ct. App. 1976).
35. Id. at 533-34, 230 N.W.2d at 8 (citations omitted).
36. See Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Jones, 317
F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979) (relying upon Alaska
state Constitution); People v. Smith, 103 Cal. App. 3d 840, 163 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Ct. App. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974) (relying
upon Hawaii state Constitution); People v. Trudeau, 385 Mich. 276, 187 N.W.2d 890 (1971);
State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (relying upon Washington state
Constitution).
37. United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Jenkins, 496
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Grill, 484 F.2d 990
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); Evalt v. United States, 382 F.2d 424 (9th
Cir. 1967); Baskerville v. United States, 227 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1955); United States v. Smith,
340 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Conn. 1972); Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 886 (1979); People v. Richards, 94 Ill. 2d 92, 445 N.E.2d 319 (1983); Farrie v. State,
255 Ind. 681, 266 N.E.2d 212 (1971); State v. Costello, 231 Kan. 337, 644 P.2d 447 (182);
State v. Bryant, 325 So. 2d 255 (La. 1975); Gee v. State, 435 A.2d 1387 (Md. 1981); People
v. Brooks, 405 Mich. 225, 274 N.W.2d 430 (1979); People v. Rivard, 59 Mich. App. 530, 230
N.W.2d 6 (Ct. App. 1975); State v. Adams, 132 N.J. Super. 256, 333 A.2d 304 (1975); People
v. Perel, 34 N.Y.2d 462 325 N.E.2d 452, 358 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1974); State v. Nelson, 298 N.C.
573, 260 S.E.2d 629 (1979); State v. Gelvin, 318 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 341 (1983).
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defendant's inventoried personal effects have relied primarily on three
arguments.
First, a valid search of the arrestee's personal effects has already taken
place.38 The argument is that the exception which justified the warrantless
search at the outset will continue to justify subsequent searches. Second, the
personal effects have been exposed to the plain view of police officers.3 9 The
argument relies upon the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement."0
Third, the inventoried personal effects are already in police custody." This
argument proceeds upon the theory that because the police already exercise
dominion over the personal effects, they have the right to subject the items
to further examination, as they would items seized as evidence of a crime.
IV. THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT AND THE SECOND SEARCH
Before evaluating the validity of the arguments advanced by those courts
asserting that no warrant is required to conduct an investigatory search of
an arrestee's inventoried personal effects, two fourth amendment issues must
be addressed using principles set forth by the Supreme Court. 2 The first issue
is whether the inventory envelope is an area in which the arrestee may claim
a constitutionally protected privacy interest."' The second issue is whether re-
quiring police to obtain a warrant before conducting an investigatory search
of inventoried personal effects safeguards the arrestee's fourth amendment
interests." As this Note demonstrates, the arrestee does have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his inventoried personal effects, and requiring a war-
rant before these effects may be searched will serve to protect his fourth amend-
ment interests.
38. Gee v. State, 435 A.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Ct. App. Md. 1981).
39. State v. Costello, 231 Kan. 337, 341, 644 P.2d 447, 450-51 (1982) ("essentially the equivalent
of a plain view case").
40. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
41. Rivard, 59 Mich. App. at 533, 230 N.W.2d at 8.
42. Doctrines set forth by the United States Supreme Court are controlling in fourth amend-
ment issues. Opinions by the Supreme Court establish minimum standards of fourth amendment
protection. States, through their own constitutions, are empowered to impose higher standards
on searches and seizures than required by the federal Constitution if they so choose. Cooper
v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
43. A person may not claim a legitimate expectation of privacy if the fourth amendment's
protection does not extend to the area in which his effects are located. Examples of areas not
afforded fourth amendment protection are open fields, Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974), and another person's purse, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98 (1980).
44. The warrant requirement would be merely a futile technicality if requiring police to obtain
a warrant would only serve to hinder law enforcement while providing no legitimate protection
to the arrestee. If characterized as a futile technicality, the only purpose the warrant requirement
would serve would be to unjustly provide the arrestee with grounds for asserting a fourth
amendment violation which could render evidence excludable. Because the primary justification
for the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of police conduct that violates fourth amendment rights,
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976), the arrestee could not argue that evidence should
be excluded if the police conduct did not result in a diminution of his rights.
[Vol. 59:321
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A. The Arrestee's Privacy Interest in His Inventoried Personal Effects
When an arrestee surrenders his personal effects pursuant to an inventory
search, both the arrestee and the police may reasonably anticipate that the
effects will be placed in the inventory envelope and remain undisturbed for
the duration of the arrestee's incarceration."5 Given the administrative care-
taking function 46 of the inventory search, it is reasonable for the arrestee
to maintain a subjective expectation that his effects will remain private for
the duration of his incarceration.
A mere subjective expectation of privacy alone is insufficient to demand
fourth amendment protection. The arrestee must also maintain an expecta-
tion which society is prepared to recognize as legitimate and reasonable. 7
A mechanism for determining whether an individual maintains a legitimate
expectation of privacy in an item is his property interest in the item.41 Clearly,
the items taken from the person of the arrestee are deemed his property."
9
One of the principal rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others. 0
Because of the circumstances justifying the inventory search,5' the arrestee's
privacy interest is insufficient to preclude the police from conducting the search.
Once the search of the arrestee and the seizure of his personal effects have
taken place and the effects are stored in the police property room, however,
the justifications for the initial intrusion are no longer present, and he should
again have a sufficient privacy expectation in his personal property to outweigh
the police interest in conducting a search.
While every container that conceals its contents from plain view provides
an individual with an expectation of privacy in its contents, the protection
varies in different settings.52 An automobile provides a minimal expectation
of privacy because it travels public thoroughfares where its contents are in
45. While the arrestee does not necessarily surrender his personal effects voluntarily, he never-
theless surrenders them with the expectation that they will remain undisturbed for the duration
of his incarceration. The fact that the arrestee is compelled to engage in the bailment is im-
material for purposes of determining his privacy expectation.
46. See supra text accompanying note 16.
47. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978) ("A burglar plying his trade
in a summer cabin during the off season may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation
of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as 'legitimate'.").
48. Although the premise that the government asserts a superior property interest at common
law has been discredited for purposes of denying an individual the right to claim a privacy in-
terest, Warden v. Hayden, 337 U.S. 294, 304 (1967), property concepts may be relied upon to
determine the presence of protected privacy interests. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12
("[t]he court has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence
or absence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.").
49. In some instances, police may contend that the items taken during the inventory search
were stolen and therefore are not the property of the arrestee. The determination of property
interests is not the type of ad hoc decision police make, but rather the determination is made
by a judicial officer who will decide if the police possess sufficient evidence and information
to establish a probable cause belief that the items do not indeed belong to the arrestee.
50. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12 (citing W. Blackstone).
51. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
52. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982).
53. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion).
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plain view.53 Another person's purse does not guarantee a privacy interest
because the individual exercises no control over it and has no standing to
complain when it is exposed to others.14 The question necessarily arises whether
an inventory envelope provides the arrestee with an expectation of privacy
in its contents.
It is well settled that containers that serve as common repositories for per-
sonal effects are inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy. The
inventory envelope is supplied by jail officials5 6 for the sole purpose of holding
and protecting the arrestee's personal effects. The envelope conceals its con-
tents from plain view, is safely stored in the police property room, and is
not held by the police for investigatory purposes. The inventory envelope,
in short, serves precisely the same functions as an item of luggage or any
other repository for personal effects.
The fact that the inventory envelope is not a piece of luggage" or an item
that the Supreme Court has already recognized as a repository of personal
effects" is inconsequential. The envelope conceals its contents from plain view
and serves the same functions as items of luggage." To suggest that an inven-
tory envelope does not provide a fourth amendment privacy expectation
because of its nonpermanent nature would be to contend that it is an "un-
worthy" container, a distinction that the Supreme Court has rejected as
illegitimate. 0
B. The Effect of a Warrant in Safeguarding the Arrestee's Fourth
Amendment Interests
Any interpretation of the fourth amendment warrant requirement should
effectively protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. 6 In
deciding whether a warrant should be required, one should consider the im-
pact of the search on the individual's sense of security 62 and the likelihood
54. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980).
55. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 11 (1977).
56. Although technically the arrestee does not own the inventory envelope, it has been assigned
for his sole use. The fact that jail officials technically own the envelope should not diminish
the arrestee's privacy expectation in its contents.
57. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
58. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (privacy interest in locked footlocker).
59. While an item of luggage often may be locked, an inventory envelope only safeguards
against intrusions by the presence of a seal. However, the fact that a suitcase is unlocked does
not affect the reasonableness of a privacy expectation. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762-63 n.9. The
person who conceals his effects from view in a container manifests an expectation that its con-
tents will remain free from public, examination. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11.
60. Ross, 456 U.S. at 822 ("For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely
entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so may a traveler who
carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim an
equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with
the locked attache case") (citations omitted).
61. For the text of the fourth amendment, see supra text accompanying note 19.
62. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 59:321
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that the burden of obtaining a warrant will frustrate the governmental pur-
pose behind the search.63 Mere technical formalities which provide no legitimate
protection to the individual but which place an unreasonable burden on law
enforcement should be avoided. In assessing whether requiring police to ob-
tain a warrant before conducting an investigatory search of an arrestee's in-
ventoried personal effects will provide the arrestee with any legitimate fourth
amendment protections, one should consider the functions served by the war-
rant requirement.
First, the warrant provides guidance to the police conducting the search
by defining its permissible scope, thereby keeping the search within constitu-
tional bounds. 64 A distinct objective of the warrant requirement is to avoid
the "general warrant" which results in the general, exploratory rummaging
through a person's belongings.6 5 A warrant accomplishes this objective by
requiring a "particular description" of the things to be seized. 66 The judicial
officer will issue the warrant, authorizing the police to search the inventory
envelope for a specific item, thereby limiting the intrusion into the items not
considered to be evidence. 67 Moreover, allowing a general warrantless in-
vestigatory search of the arrestee's personal effects to try to establish his con-
nection with another crime "bestows upon the police an undeserved windfall
and provides them with a temptation to make subterfuge arrests." 68
A second purpose of the warrant requirement is to ensure that the pro-
bable cause determination is made by a neutral and detached judicial officer,
rather than by the police officer who is "engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime. ' 69 Because the police officer's duty is to
detect crime and arrest criminals, he may not be entrusted to protect an in-
dividual's right to privacy.70 Rather, that determination is to be made through
a separation of powers and division of functions among the different bran-
63. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
64. Note, Persons Lawfully Arrested for Alleged Possession of Narcotics Have a Privacy
Interest in a Footlocker in Their Possession at the Time of Their Arrest Which is Protected
by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, 6 Am. J. CRIM. L. 81, 90 (1978) [hereinafter
referred to as Persons Lawfully Arrested].
65. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 467 (1971).
66. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467.
67. Obtaining a warrant will decrease the likelihood that evidence will be excluded, particularly
in those states where the "good faith exception" has been adopted. If a valid warrant has been
obtained in a state with the "good faith exception," the defendant must show that the police
acted in bad faith in obtaining an improvidently issued warrant.
68. See, 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzURE: A TREATIsE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
5.3(b), at 320 (1978) (citations omitted) [hereinafter referred to as LAFAVE]. Police would be
able to arrest an individual for a minor offense, and seize the contents of his pockets, briefcase
and car for safekeeping purposes, and use the items in a general investigation for evidence of
criminal conduct unrelated to the offense for which the person was arrested. Farrie v. State,
266 N.E.2d 212, 216 (Ind. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
69. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); see also Persons Lawfully Arrested,
supra note 64, at 90.
70. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) ("Power is a heady thing; and
history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted.").
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ches of government.7" The duty of the often biased police officer is to obtain
information and present it to the neutral judicial officer, who in turn, will
make the probable cause determination.
A third function served by requiring police to obtain a warrant before con-
ducting a search of the arrestee's inventoried personal effects is to prevent
hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of the search.
7
2
If evidence is obtained pursuant to a warrantless search without probable cause,
judicial review may focus upon the fact that evidence was found in the inven-
tory envelope, rather than the officer's lack of information to support a show-
ing of probable cause. Requiring police to obtain a warrant before conduc-
ting a search of the inventory envelope will ensure that the determination of
probable cause is based upon information known to the police and the judicial
officer prior to the search, and not upon information gathered during the
search.
While in some instances the warrant requirement may be a mere formality
in that the court will issue a warrant based upon conclusory statements made
by a police officer, at least one purpose will be served by requiring a warrant
prior to the search. If the warrant is later challenged as being improvidently
issued, judicial review will be facilitated by requiring a prior sworn statement
of police justifications for conducting the search." The prior sworn state-
ment will prevent the police from conducting general exploratory searches and
will limit the use of hindsight to evaluate the reasonableness of the search.
Requiring a warrant before allowing an investigatory search of an inven-
tory envelope is not intended to protect criminals or to make the envelope
a haven for contraband or evidence of a crime. Rather, the warrant is re-
quired so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade the arrestee's
privacy against the need for effective law enforcement.7 While an individual
may incur a diminution in his privacy expectation subsequent to arrest, that
diminution is limited to his person."5 The diminution in the arrestee's privacy
expectation in his person is brought about by the exigencies created by his
arrest and incarceration. Those exigencies are not present in the case of a
sealed inventory envelope in the police property room. Courts should be reluc-
tant to discard an individual's privacy rights merely because he has been
charged with a crime.76 Those privacy rights may be safeguarded by requiring
police to obtain a warrant before inspecting his personal effects.
71. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
72. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964);
Persons Lawfully Arrested, supra note 64, at 90.
73. Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433, 437 (1969).
Police will be prevented from making after-the-fact justifications for the search. Rather, they
will be compelled to rely upon the information contained in the record in justifying the search
warrant.
74. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455-56.
75. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977).
76. It is noteworthy that the arrestee has only been charged with an offense and is clothed
with a presumption of innocence. To suggest that an arrestee has no privacy interest in his per-
sonal effects because of the arrest would mean that the effects could be rummaged through
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Although requiring police to obtain a warrant before conducting an in-
vestigatory search of the envelope will impose a burden on police, that burden
does not outweigh the need to protect the arrestee's privacy rights in his per-
sonal effects. The mere fact that law enforcement may be made more effi-
cient cannot justify the disregard of the fourth amendment." Moreover, the
burden on police does not appear to be excessive. If the police are concerned
that the arrestee may be released along with his personal effects, they may
detain the inventory envelope for a reasonable period of time pending a judicial
ruling on a search warrant request.71
Having established that the arrestee maintains a legitimate privacy interest
in his personal effects which may be protected by the warrant requirement,
the question remains whether the circumstances surrounding the inventory
search call for an exception to the warrant requirement. The arguments ad-
vanced by courts that have allowed warrantless investigatory searches of the
arrestee's inventoried personal effects must be considered.
C. The Search Incident to Arrest and Inventory Search Exceptions
There is little doubt that a valid arrest provides police with the authority
to conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee at the jail prior to
incarceration. 9 The inventory search exception, however, does not permit all
future searches of the arrestee or his personal effects without imposing limita-
tions upon the scope of the search.
A fundamental objective to be pursued in any search is to limit the intru-
sion as much as possible. 0 The scope of a warrantless search must be strictly
tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible."' The inventory search is justified by the need to protect the
owner's property while it remains in police custody, to protect the police against
claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and to protect police from
potential danger.82 Once the arrestee's personal effects are in the custody of
the police in the property room, each of the above goals has been effectuated83
at will, even if the arrestee is later found to be innocent. See People v. Smith, 103 Cal. App.
3d 840, 845-46, 163 Cal. Rptr. 322, 325 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981) (rejecting this
conclusion).
77. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
78. In United States v. Place, 51 U.S.L.W. 4844, 4845 (U.S. June 20, 1983), the Court ex-
plained that "where law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that a container
holds contraband or evidence of a crime, but have not secured a warrant, they may seize the
property, pending issuance of a warrant to examine its contents, if the exigencies of the cir-
cumstances demand it or some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement is pre-
sent." And in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970), the Court upheld the deten-
tion of a package sent through the mails until a search warrant could be obtained.
79. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
80. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
81. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
82. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
83. The arrestee's personal effects are isolated from the police and the jail population, pro-
tecting the arrestee's interest in these effects and diminishing the possibility that police personnel
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and no recognized goal of the inventory search would be furthered by allow-
ing an investigatory search. Indeed, allowing a post-inventory search of the
arrestee's personal effects may actually undermine the established goals of
the inventory search. The possibility that the arrestee's personal effects may
be stolen or that he may claim items were stolen is enhanced when the effects
are repeatedly handled by police personnel.1
4
The Supreme Court has been further compelled to legitimate inventory
searches because they are a part of the routine procedure incident to in-
carcerating an arrested person." The Court has noted that if a search is car-
ried out in accordance with standard procedures in the local police depart-
ment, it tends to ensure that the intrusion is limited in scope to the extent
necessary to carry out the caretaking function.8 Alternatively, warrantless
investigatory searches of an arrestee's inventoried personal effects are not con-
ducted pursuant to any routine procedure, but are left solely to the discretion
of police. Such investigatory searches could be conducted in a haphazard man-
ner, and no mechanism exists to ensure that they are properly limited in scope.
In order to accept the foregoing arguments, they must first be reconciled
with the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in United States v. Edwards.7 In
Edwards, the defendant was arrested late at night and charged with attempt-
ing to break into the city post office. He was taken to the local jail and plac-
ed in a cell, but was allowed to retain the clothing he was wearing when ar-
rested. Subsequent investigation revealed that paint chips remained on the
window sill where the attempted entry took place. The defendant's clothing
was taken from him and held as evidence. Examination of the clothing revealed
paint chips matching those found on the window sill.
In holding that the seizure of Edwards' clothing was constitutionally per-
missible, the majority first noted that the administrative booking process in-
cident to custodial arrest had not ended by the time Edwards was placed in
the cell." The later search of Edwards' clothing was not a second search subse-
quent to booking, but rather was a delayed search incident to arrest.8 9
The Edwards majority was further compelled to uphold the search because
the defendant retained possession of the clothes containing evidence. It is
reasonable for an officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's
may steal or damage the personal effects. Moreover, the danger that the arrestee will have a
weapon in his possession is reduced by holding his personal effects in the property room for
the duration of his incarceration.
84. LAFAvE, supra note 68, § 5.5, at 360 n.50.
85. Illinois v. Lafayette, 51 U.S.L.W. 4829, 4831 (U.S. June 20, 1983); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
86. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 374-75 (1976).
87. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
88. Id. at 804.
89. The majority stated:
This was and is a normal incident of a custodial arrest, and reasonable delay in
effectuating it does not change the fact that Edwards was no more imposed upon
than he could have been at the time and place of the arrest or immediately upon
arrival at the place of detention.
Edwards, 415 U.S. at 805.
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person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. In Edwards, Justice
White noted that the clothes could have been brushed down and vacuumed
while Edwards had them in the cell."
The circumstances that justified the warrantless search in Edwards are not
present when police seek to conduct an investigatory search of the arrestee's
inventoried personal effects. In Edwards, the administrative booking process
had not yet been completed and the arrestee maintained possession of destruc-
tible evidence. When the arrestee's personal effects are inventoried and stored
for safekeeping, however, the administrative booking process has been com-
pleted and there is no longer any possibility that the arrestee can gain posses-
sion of destructible evidence.
The Edwards Court was apparently referring only to searches of personal
items still in the arrestee's possession at the place of detention, such as his
clothing.92 In a later decision, the Court recognized that during a custodial
search the threat that weapons or destructible evidence may be involved
necessitates a warrantless search of items within the arrestee's immediate
control.9 3 The Court further stated, however, that when no exigency is pre-
sent to demand an immediate search, the warrant clause of the fourth amend-
ment prohibits searches of property that has come under the exclusive domi-
nion of police authority.9 4 Once an inventory search has taken place, the per-
sonal effects which may contain evidence are in the exclusive control of the
police and no exigent circumstances are present to justify a warrantless search.
D. The Plain View Doctrine
A common justification for warrantless seizures of evidence or contraband
discovered during an inventory search is the plain view exception." Under
the plain view doctrine, an object that comes into view during a search incident
to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope may be seized without a
warrant.96 It has been suggested that the plain view doctrine allows warrantless
90. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
91. Edwards, 415 U.S. at 806.
92. United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1171 (8th Cir. 1978).
93. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977).
94. Id. at 15. The Chadwick opinion has been interpreted as limiting Edwards to its facts.
United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1290 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Berry,
560 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 571 F.2d 2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom., Wilson v. United States, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
95. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 465.
96. It has been suggested that the "plain view" doctrine does not necessarily establish an
exception to the warrant requirement in that Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, was
a plurality opinion and the prior case law did not clearly establish "plain view" as an exception.
See Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography
Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Moylan]. Justice Rehnquist
has suggested that "plain view" may be better understood not as an independent "exception"
to the warrant requirement, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for
an officer's "access to an object" may be. Texas v. Brown, 51 U.S.L.W. 4361, 4364 (U.S. April
19, 1983) (plurality opinion). However, a majority of the justices still adhere to the characteriza-
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investigatory searches of the arrestee's inventoried personal effects because
those effects have already come into the plain view of the police conducting
the search. 7
To be a permissible search and seizure under the plain view doctrine, three
conditions must be satisfied. First, there must be a prior valid intrusion."
When the police legitimately enter an area and observe an item that is ob-
viously evidence of a crime, it may be needlessly inconvenient, and sometimes
dangerous, to require them to ignore it until they have obtained a warrant
particularly describing it." Second, the discovery must be inadvertent.'0 0 The
plain view exception never permits the legitimation of a planned warrantless
seizure. I0' Third, it must be immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them.' 2 The police must have probable cause' 3 at the time
they view the item to believe that it is evidence of a crime.
When the arrestee is subjected to a valid inventory search pursuant to an
arrest, all of the required conditions may be met. The police are authorized
to conduct the inventory search,' 04 they are not conducting the search to un-
cover specific items, and their observations can provide them with a probable
cause belief that items are evidence of a crime.' 5 Items discovered during
a valid inventory search may thus be seized if they are immediately apparent
as contraband or evidence of a crime. However, in an investigatory search
tion of the exception established by the plurality in Coolidge. See, e.g., id. at 4366 (1983) (Powell,
J., concurring) ("Whatever my view might have been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason
at this late date to imply criticism of its articulation of this exception.").
97. Professor LaFave suggests, "[t]he only question which arguably might deserve prior judicial
scrutiny is whether the object in question is probably of evidentiary value, but that is precisely
the kind of determination which is regularly left to the police under the plain view doctrine."
LAFAvE, supra note 68, at 316. See also People v. Richards, 94 Ill. 2d 92, 445 N.E.2d 319
(1983); State v. Costello, 231 Kan. 337, 644 P.2d 447 (1982).
98. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466. The prior valid intrusion may be pursuant to a warrant to
search for other items, pursuant to a valid warrantless search for other items, during a search
incident to arrest inside a protected area or following any other valid intrusion. See Moylan,
supra note 96, at 1075-78.
99. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467-68.
100. Id. at 469.
101. Id. at 479 n.27.
102. Id. at 466. The plurality in Texas v. Brown, 51 U.S.L.W. 4361, characterized the "im-
mediately apparent" language of Coolidge as an "unhappy choice of words." However, a majority
of the court refused to acquiesce in the plurality's characterization of the doctrine. See supra
note 96.
103. Coolidge did not define the degree of certainty required, but "rtlhe broad and evolving
consensus [of lower courts] . . . is that the standard of certainty must be that of probable
cause." Moylan, supra note 96, at 1084.
104. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
105. If the officer immediately recognizes an item as contraband or evidence of a crime, but
nevertheless places it in the inventory envelope for safekeeping, the requirements for the plain
view exception have technically been fulfilled. Courts should be cautious in accepting such an
explanation from police, for it may serve as a pretext for an illegal investigatory search. The
question must always be asked in such a situation why the officer did not isolate the item as
evidence, rather than place it with the arrestee's other personal effects which may be surrendered
to him if he is released on bail.
[Vol. 59:321
PRIVACY EXPECTATION
of the arrestee's inventoried personal effects, none of the requirements of
the plain view doctrine are met.
To assert that the plain view doctrine provides the officer with the initial
justification to conduct a warrantless search of the inventory envelope begs
the question. The plain view doctrine comes into play only when another in-
itial justification exists for the intrusion. 10 6 Because a search incident to arrest
is no longer appropriate after the arrestee's personal effects are taken from
him, 0 7 there is no prior valid intrusion. The second requirement is that the
discovery must be inadvertent. When police conduct an investigatory search
of the arrestee's inventoried personal effects, however, it is not an inadver-
tent discovery, but rather a planned warrantless seizure which the plain view
doctrine can never justify.10 8 The third plain view requirement is that it must
be immediately apparent to police that the item is contraband or evidence
of a crime. During an inventory of the arrestee's pezsonal effects, items that
fulfill the immediately apparent requirement are not placed in the inventory
envelope.'0 9 Rather, such items are seized by police as evidence, with the
envelope being reserved for those personal items immediately thought to be
of no harm and no evidentiary value.
Aside from the fact that the procedural safeguards of the plain view doc-
trine have not been complied with in the investigatory search of an arrestee's
personal effects, strong policy reasons exist for not allowing such warrantless
searches to take place under the auspices of the plain view doctrine. The plain
view doctrine merely justifies the seizure of evidence" 0 and is not intended
to expand the situations in which a search can be initiated."' To expand the
plain view doctrine to include all situations in which items have previously
been exposed to police would extend the doctrine well beyond the point which
it was intended to reach." 2
Moreover, the requirement that the item be immediately apparent as evidence
serves a vital function in determining probable cause. When the officer is
aware of the characteristics of an item sought as evidence, he can make a
valid probable cause determination based upon his contemporaneous ob-
servation of the item found on the arrestee's person. However, when the of-
ficer becomes aware of the characteristics of an item in question after the
inventory has taken place, days or weeks may have passed since he observed
106. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
107. See United States v. Prescott, 599 F.2d 103, 105 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Inventory searches
must be limited to effectuation of the recognized purposes for which they are conducted ... .
108. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471 n.27.
109. See supra note 105.
110. Note, "Plain View" and the "Plain View Doctrine, " 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 290, 291
(1982).
111. A valid intrusion must already be in progress. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
112. The Coolidge plurality stated that "the mere fact that the police have legitimately obtained
a plain view of a piece of incriminating evidence is not enough to justify warrantless seizure."
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471 n.27.
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the item found on the arrestee's person." 3 The officer's probable cause deter-
mination may be affected by his desire to obtain evidence of a crime.
A related question is whether the arrestee maintains a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the contents of a container previously exposed to police.,"
This question was presented to the United States Supreme Court in Illinois
v. Andreas."' In Andreas, authorities discovered illegal drugs inside a table
during a valid customs search. In order to arrest the consignee in possession
of the table, police effected a "controlled delivery" of the table. After the
table was delivered to the defendant, police searched the table without a war-
rant and again discovered the illegal drugs. In holding the search to be per-
missible under the fourth amendment, the Court said that "absent a substan-
tial likelihood that the contents have been changed, there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the contents of a container previously opened under
lawful authority."",6
The peculiar circumstances which justified the warrantless search in Andreas
are not present in the search of an arrestee's inventoried personal effects.
In Andreas, the authorities were aware at the time of the first search that
the packages found in the table contained illegal drugs and were reasonably
certain that the contents of the table had not changed in any way before the
second search. Because the police only delayed the seizure of the packages
in order to effect the controlled delivery, the Court was able to rely upon
the plain view doctrine to validate the search." 7
On the other hand, when an arrestee's personal effects are placed in an
inventory envelope, police have no reason to suspect that the items are con-
traband or evidence of a crime, and do not subject those items to special
scrutiny. Moreover, while the police resealed the container in Andreas in order
to effect the controlled delivery, police seal the inventory envelope solely to
protect the arrestee's interest in the items and do not anticipate examining
the envelope's contents again. The Court in Andreas stated that "[t]he simple
act of resealing the container to enable the police to make a controlled delivery
does not operate to revive or restore the lawfully invaded privacy rights. ""I8
113. The problem is further compounded when an officer receives information regarding an
item found on the person of the arrestee from another officer who conducted the inventory
search. For an example of that fact pattern, see Richards, 94 II. 2d 92, 445 N.E.2d 319 (finding
second search reasonable).
114. In Illinois v. Andreas, 51 U.S.L.W. 5157, 5159 (U.S. July 5, 1983), the Court noted
that "Itihe plain view doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully
in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost.
." But see supra note 112.
115. 51 U.S.L.W. 5157, 5159 (U.S. July 5, 1983).
116. Id. at 5159.
117. The Court noted that "once a container has been found to a certainty to contain illicit
drugs, the contraband becomes like objects physically within the plain view of the police, and
the claim to privacy is lost. Consequently, the subsequent reopening of the container is not a
'search' within the intendment of the Fourth Amendment." Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
118. Id. (emphasis added).
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Andreas may thus be read as permitting police to conduct a warrantless second
search of a container as part of a controlled delivery, but may not be extend-
ed to every instance in which police have previously viewed an item." 9
E. Police Possession of a Container
When the police conduct an inventory search of an arrestee pursuant to
a valid arrest, they rightfully maintain possession of the arrestee's personal
effects as bailees. To determine whether rightful possession of the inventory
envelope entitles police to search its contents, one should consider the nature
of both the inventory search and the process of holding the effects for safekeep-
ing. While searches for evidence based upon probable cause are criminal in
nature, inventory searches are considered noncriminal, routine administrative
caretaking functions.' 0 The justification for the police to possess the envelope
is unrelated to any evidence-finding function. Unlike police possession of items
seized as evidence, items held pursuant to an inventory search are surrendered
to the arrestee when he is released. To ensure that the arrestee's privacy in-
terests are protected, the authority of police to possess and inspect an arrestee's
personal effects should be limited to the terms which authorized the police
to take possession at the outset. 2 ' Because police possession of an inventory
envelope is authorized by the need to protect the interests of both the arrestee
and the police, the terms of the possession should be limited to the effectua-
tion of these goals, and should not extend to investigatory searches.
The United States Supreme Court has refused to allow warrantless searches
based solely upon police possession of a container. In Walter v. United
States,'22 federal agents obtained possession of sealed packages containing films
which were mistakenly delivered to a third party rather than to the consignee.
Without attempting to obtain a warrant, the agents viewed the films with
a projector and discovered that the films were of an obscene nature. The Court
held that the viewing of the films without a warrant constituted an illegal
search, emphasizing that an officer's authority to possess a package is distinct
from his authority to examine its contents.'23 The agents in Walter were
authorized to possess the packages containing films, but were required to ob-
tain a warrant before inspecting the contents. Similarly, the terms that authorize
119. This conclusion is consistent with the Court's opinion in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499 (1978), where the Court held that even though firemen have legally entered a house, their
subsequent entries may require a warrant. See also Michigan v. Clifford, 52 U.S.L.W. 4056
(U.S. Jan. 11, 1984); United States v. Hoffman, 607 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1979). An additional
factor tending to support the Court's decision in Andreas is that controlled deliveries are con-
ducted pursuant to routine police procedure. Thus, the intrusion is limited in scope to the extent
necessary to carry out the controlled delivery. Because searches of inventory envelopes are not
conducted pursuant to routine procedure, they do not have such safeguards. See supra notes 85-86.
120. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1976).
121. See generally cases cited supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
122. 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (plurality opinion).
123. Id. at 654-55 (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1978)); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10 (1977)).
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police to possess the inventory envelope are limited to an administrative
caretaking function, and those terms do not enable them to search the envelope
without prior recourse to a judicial officer.
CONCLUSION
The process of inventorying an arrestee's personal effects has developed
as the result of legitimate needs to protect the interests of both the police
and the arrestee. The policy reasons for allowing warrantless inventory searches
are distinct from those justifying warrantless investigatory searches in that
inventory searches are noncriminal in nature. The investigatory search of the
arrestee's inventoried personal effects is criminal in nature, however, and
should not be treated in the same manner as the noncriminal inventory search.
Rather, police should be required to obtain advance approval from a judicial
officer or be prepared to demonstrate that an established exception to the
warrant requirement is applicable.
JOHN M. WRAY
